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A B S T R A C T
In developing countries, a significant share of land transactions occurs among closely related parties and often
does not entail any specific compensation (in-kind or monetary). Despite the prevalence of these non-market or
informal transactions, the literature has paid little attention to the determinants and consequences of these
exchanges. In this paper we shed light on the role land use certificates play on the agreed compensation of rental
agreements when landlords, particularly those with weaker ex-ante tenure security (i.e. women), rent out land to
their relatives in Viet Nam. We find that female-headed households who lease their plots to relatives are less
likely to receive any type of payment, unless they possess a title for the plot they leased. A regional decom-
position of our results shows that this effect is more predominant in the Northern regions.
1. Introduction
Weak enforcement of property rights has long been considered one
of the key determinants of low agricultural productivity in developing
countries. While many studies have focused on the tenure security
channel (i.e. certainty of reaping the fruits of your work will in-
centivize long-term investment) another important mechanism
through which property rights foster productivity is by allowing
landholdings to be transferred to those better equipped to make pro-
ductive use of them (e.g. via sales or rental markets). Several studies
have documented the importance of well-functioning land markets for
efficiency and equity in the rural sector (Skoufias, 1995; Banerjee
et al., 2002; Holden et al. 2010; de Janvry et al., 2015; Chari et al.,
2017; Chen et al. 2017).
Moreover, the literature has widely discussed the implications of
gender differentials on property rights for agricultural productivity
(Udry, 1996; Goldstein and Udry, 2008). Indeed, Agarwal (1995) ar-
gues that the single most important economic factor affecting women's
situation in Southeast Asia is the gender gap in control and ownership
of land. This inequality has crucial effects in the functioning of rental
markets. In Ethiopia for example, Ghebru and Holden (2014) find that
female landlords have lower yields in the plots they sharecrop with
same-kin tenants. The authors suggest this is driven by opportunistic
behaviour from tenants who, when kin is close, put less effort and in-
puts on sharecropped plots from women because the risk of eviction is
lower.
In this paper we use the biennial Viet Nam Access to Resources
Household Survey (VARHS) for the period 2008–2016 to explore the
gender-specific impact of Land Use Rights Certificates (LUCs) on the
choice of tenant and the compensation obtained by landlords in the rental
market. Our results show that female-headed households that lease land
to relatives are 25 per cent less likely to receive any type of compensation,
unless they have a LUC for such plot. Our findings are robust to the en-
dogeneity of plots getting titled within a household, and landlord’s se-
lection bias of tenant choice. One concern with informal land transfers is
that compensation may not be directly stated, but it is implied and re-
ceived through other channels (e.g. gifts or transfers). We corroborate this
is not the case by showing that households renting their plots out for free
do not receive more gifts or transfers from their relatives, even when af-
fected by a negative shock. Moreover, we present a regional decomposi-
tion of our empirical analysis and we find that our results are being mostly
driven by the dynamics of rental markets in the North of Viet Nam.
Furthermore, we explore the impact of these non-market land ren-
tals on agricultural productivity and household income. Our findings
show that farmers who receive land for free are systematically less
productive than those who pay for it. This suggests that non-compen-
sated land transactions might be less efficiency enhancing than those
that are market based. Moreover, households engaging in non-market
transactions give up on average 5 percent of their income due to these
informal transactions.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as far as
we know, this is the only study showing the relationship between
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property rights and agreed compensation in rental markets, particularly
in the case of groups with weaker ex-ante tenure security (i.e. women).
Second, this is the first study of land rental markets in Viet Nam that
explicitly distinguishes between formal and informal transactions.1 This
is surprising given that informal transactions represent more than half
of the land rentals in the country. Additionally, our regional analysis
provides insights on how policy changes in land tenure are likely to
have a more significant impact in the Northern provinces of Viet Nam,
where social institutions and attitudes towards market-oriented policies
are considerably different than in the South.
The findings of this paper are useful to orient agricultural policies in
the developing world. First, it highlights the importance of taking into
account ex ante property rights enforcement for vulnerable groups
(women, in our case) when undertaking a land tenure reform. Second, it
sheds light on the effect that informal land transfers can have on
agricultural productivity and income of poor landlords. Lastly, the re-
gional decomposition of our findings shows the importance of con-
sidering pre-existing institutions and norms before implementing
structural reforms that seek to modify such arrangements.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we outline our
conceptual framework, in Section 3 we describe the land reforms un-
dertaken in Viet Nam and their implications for women’s land rights.
The data and some descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4. In
Section 5 we discuss the estimation strategy we employ to test our
hypotheses and in Section 6 we present our results. In Section 7 we
conclude with some final remarks.
2. Conceptual framework
The literature discusses two main reasons a landlord may decide to
participate in land rental markets. First, as an economy advances in the
process of economic development, opportunities in the non-agricultural
sector will improve. This will trigger a process of structural transfor-
mation where rural households with a comparative advantage in non-
farming activities will leave agriculture to pursue more attractive op-
portunities in other industries (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010).2 Second, a
low endowment of non-land agricultural factors of production (e.g.
labour) drives landowners to lease out their property for income gen-
eration. We think the latter framework is what best describes the be-
haviour of female landlords. Though in theory women could just hire
workers until they reach their optimal farm scale, agricultural labour
markets have high costs of monitoring and enforcing effort (Feder,
1985). Moreover, these costs are likely to be higher for women since
tradition in Viet Nam dictates farming decision should be taken by men
(Tran, 2001).3
Despite the potential benefits of land markets, participation in
land rentals faces considerable challenges. Weak enforcement of
property rights increases the risk of losing your land when it is rented
out, discouraging potential landlords from participating in rental
markets (Besley and Ghatak, 2010). Also, tenure insecurity can in-
fluence landlord’s choice of tenant and rental arrangement in the
market. In Madagascar, Bellemare (2012) finds that landlords with a
lower perceived tenure security were more likely to engage in
sharecropping contracts instead of fixed rents because participating
in the production process increases the landlord’s claims to the land
(land-to-the-tiller agricultural system). In the Dominican Republic,
Macours et al. (2010) find that tenure insecurity and weak contract
enforcement leads landlords to operate along similar socio-economic
lines, which comes with significant detrimental effects on efficiency
and equity.
The imperfections in rental markets are more likely to dis-
proportionally affect female landowners, since they normally have
weaker property rights (Agarwal, 1995; Menon et al., 2017). Evidence
from Ethiopia shows that female landlords have lower productivity in
the plots they sharecrop, compared to male landlords. Holden and
Bezabih (2008) suggest the reason for this gender differential could be
that women may be forced to rent land to in-laws as opposed to the best
(and presumably most productive) bidder. This results not only in an
overall efficiency and productivity loss, but also in a worse outcome for
the landlord that might not be able to receive fair compensation. Land
titles can be an efficient mechanism to correct this kind of distortions.
In Ethiopia, Holden et al. (2011) find that a low-cost land certification
program had a relatively larger effect on women’s participation in
rental markets.
In this paper we want to understand the relationship between
property rights and landlord’s choice of tenant and agreed ex-ante
compensation for the land transaction. If land certificates strengthen
landlord’s property rights, we would expect that households who have
their plots titled—especially those with weaker ex-ante tenure secur-
ity—would obtain better compensations in the rental market. This is
because with the improvement in property rights, landlords no longer
fear expropriation when renting out to non-related parties, so they can
chose from a wider pool of possible tenants. Consequently, their bar-
gaining power increases, so even if they ultimately decide to lease to a
relative, such rental agreement would be conducted under better cir-
cumstances for the landlord. If women have weaker ex-ante tenure se-
curity, then the effect of land certification on the probability to obtain
compensation for the land rented out to relatives should be larger for
female landowners.
3. Background: Land tenure and gender in Viet Nam
During the 1980s Viet Nam started a de-collectivization process in
its agricultural sector to form a production system based on household
initiative. Before the reforms took place, agricultural production was
carried out collectively and farmers were compensated by the hours
they worked. However, after facing severe food shortages at the be-
ginning of the 1980s, the government implemented a new policy in
which farmers were responsible for delivering a quota to the commune
and allowed them to keep or sell any surplus.4 With the implementation
of the Doi Moi reforms in 1988, the government addressed some con-
cerns regarding tenancy security and started the privatization and de-
centralization of output and input markets (but land market transac-
tions remained illegal).
In 1993, a new land law was enacted to transfer private usage rights
to rural households. Though the land remains the property of the State,
households received land use certificates (LUCs) that allow them to
1 Khai et al. (2013) show that generally land obtained through rental or sale
markets is operated by more productive farmers than plots allocated by local
authorities in Viet Nam, but they do not study the difference between formal
and informal temporary land transfers.
2 Estimations from the 2009 population census in Viet Nam reveal that the
annual rate of migration within provinces, mostly from the countryside to ci-
ties, increased from 0.6 percent in 1999 to 4.2 percent in 2009 (Narciso, 2017).
Moreover, rural households with higher welfare tend to substitute agricultural
activities with wage labour and entrepreneurial activities (Kinghan and
Newman, 2017).
3 Also male-headed households who lease out land are better off than male-
headed households that do not; their income levels are 42 percent higher than
other male-headed households that do not rent out land. The opposite is true for
female landlords, as they have 6 percent less income than other female-headed
households. This suggests that the factors determining rental market partici-
pation differ crucially depending on the gender of the household head. While
men decide to participate in rental markets because it allows them to pursue
opportunities outside agriculture and improve their incomes, female landlords
tend to rent out land because they are too old to farm it and lack the resources
to do it properly (female-headed households have fewer household members,
less capital and are considerably older).
4 These reforms had a positive and significant effect on rice production
(Pingali and Xuan, 1992).
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transfer, lease, mortgage and bequest the usage rights of their land.5
The land certification program was one of the most extensive in the
world: by the year 2000 the Vietnamese government had issued more
than 11 million certificates, granting land titles to more than 90 percent
of rural households (Do and Iyer, 2008). However, the implementation
of the land reform had important regional differences and land certi-
fication has failed to increase in the last decade (Markussen, 2017).
Do and Iyer (2008) argue that the General Department of Land
Administration (GDLA) faced two main challenges in the implementa-
tion of the reform: lack of manpower in commune land registry offices
and the time taken to resolve disputes related to land ownership. The
heterogeneity of administrative capacity of provinces resulted in very
different speeds of land certification. For example, the authors see that
the proportion of households with LUCs in 1998 varied from 12 percent
to 100 percent across different provinces, and that in 2000 five pro-
vinces have failed to achieve coverage in more than 75 percent of the
households in the province.
More recent data suggests land certification still faces challenges in
some regions; according to our sample, in the Mekong River Delta al-
most all plots have a LUC, while in the Central Highlands titling is least
prevalent. Even among the Northern provinces we observe significant
differences; in Phu Tho, a relatively rich province in the north, more
than 90 percent of plots have titles while the highland provinces of Dien
Bien and Lai Chau have less that 40 percent of their plots titled.
Markussen (2017) says that one of the reasons why land titling has
stayed constant in the last decade could be informal fees or corruption
in the land administration system.6 Also, the Governance module of the
2008 Viet Nam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) reports
that 55 percent of rural households perceive that the process of LUC
issuance is affected by corruption in local governments (World Bank,
2009, ch. 3).
The 1993 Land Law increased agricultural investment and allowed
households to pursue non-farming activities (Do and Iyer, 2008). Ac-
cording to Deininger and Jin (2008) the legalization of land usage
transfers increased efficiency and allowed poor households to access
land as the non-agricultural sector of the economy evolved.7 Moreover,
the prevalence of State allocations has been gradually substituted by
transfers among individual households, resulting in sizeable pro-
ductivity gains (Khai et al., 2013).8 Despite the apparent consensus on
the benefits of Vietnam’s land reforms, others have argued that the land
laws aggravated inequality and created a growing class of landless ci-
tizens (e.g. Akram-Lodhi, 2005). Such claims have also been made from
the perspective of gender inequality in access to land.
Menon et al. (2017) argue that some features of the 1993 land re-
form in Viet Nam exacerbated gender disparities in property rights. For
example, the law allowed for only one name to be in the certificate as
the sole owner of the land; in most cases the man—being the head of
the household—had his name registered in the title. Also, the
certification was granted at the farm level instead of the plot level
(which could have allowed for some differentiation in asset ownership
between husbands and wives). Finally, the authors mention that some
of the guidelines in the land redistribution process favoured men over
women, and this inequality was worsened by social norms and cultural
traditions in which farm production decisions were made primarily by
men (Tran, 2001).9 Between 2000 and 2003 a series of legislative
changes were conducted to address this gender disparity. The Marriage
and Family Law of 2000 declares that any LUC obtained during the
course of the marriage should be counted as common property (i.e.
have both names in the title). Moreover, an amendment to the Land
Law in 2003 indicates that certification has to be carried out at the plot
level, which allows a legal differentiation in asset ownership for both
husband and wife.10 Nonetheless, some have argued that the im-
plementation of these changes has not been properly enforced because
of lack of administrative capacities in rural agencies (Ravallion and van
de Walle, 2008; World Bank, 2002).
The land tenure system in Viet Nam ─unlike China and other
African countries─ is not characterized by extensive land reallocations
or expropriations, and the land reforms undertaken in the past decades
have come a long way in improving tenure security.11 Nonetheless, it is
still possible that gender differences in land rights affect the functioning
of rental markets, particularly when the transactions happen among
relatives. In our sample, more than half of the plots that were rented out
did not lead to any compensation for the landlord (monetary or in-kind)
and more than two thirds of the rentals occurred among relatives.12 The
prevalence of such a high level of informal transactions raises concerns
because it could be a reflection of property rights imbalances among
households, as those with weaker claims over land may fail to receive
adequate and fair compensation.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis will be based on the Viet Nam Access to
Resources Household Survey (VARHS), covering the period 2008–2016.
The VARHS is conducted every two years and is a representative sample
of the rural population in Viet Nam. We rely on the balanced panel
sample which consists of 2131 rural households that were surveyed in
all the five waves collected in the period under analysis. The surveyed
households are located in 476 communes across 12 different provinces.
The dataset contains precise information on household demographics,
economic activities, land use and agricultural production. Crucially, the
survey contains detailed plot-level characteristics and information on
land rental agreements (e.g. relationship to the tenant, type of contract
and agreed payment).
In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics of the main variables
5 The duration of use rights was set at 20 years for annual crops and 50 years
for perennial crops. However an amendment to the Land Law in 2013 set the
duration of use rights to 50 years for all types of crops.
6 We would expect this kind of restrictions to be more binding for vulnerable
households. Indeed, Markussen and Tarp (2014) show that political connections
are positively related to increase land tenure security and investment.
7 A proper functioning of land markets is essential for a smooth readjustment
of labour from agriculture to other industries (Adamopoulos et al., 2017). This
process is particularly important in Viet Nam since the share of the labour force
devoted to agriculture decreased from 70 per cent in 1996 to 44 per cent in
2015 (ILOSTAT, 2017).
8 Vietnam and other post-socialist economies have traditionally relied on
administrative reallocation of land instead of markets. However, evidence from
China suggests that though reallocations assign land to households with low
land endowments and numerous families, markets are a better mechanism since
they ultimately assign the land to farmers with higher ability (Deininger and
Jin, 2005; Kimura et al., 2011).
9 For example, the age of the household head and the number of household
members in working age were considered for the amount of land allocated,
given that the legal retirement age for women is 55 and for men 60 and female-
headed households tend to have fewer working-age members, women tend to
receive less land than men.
10 Newman et al. (2015) say that, conditional on the plot having a certificate,
registering the plot under two names as opposed to one does not affect pro-
ductivity. They argue that including both names in the certificate could be a
useful policy to increase women’s bargaining power within the household, since
there is no trade-off between productivity and including two names in the
certificate instead of one. Menon et al. (2017) find that land-use rights held
exclusively by women or jointly by couples result in higher household ex-
penditures, more women’s self-employment and lower household vulnerability
to poverty.
11 In our data, only around two percent of the plots were expropriated by
commune authorities in a given year.
12 Virtually all of the contracts contemplating some sort of compensation have
the form of fixed rent. Therefore, we will now only distinguish between rental
contracts with and without compensation, regardless of the type of payment
arrangement (fixed rent or sharecropping).
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used in the analysis by gender of the household head. Drawing from the
entire five-wave sample, we observe that female household heads tend
to be less educated and older; they also have fewer members, and in
particular fewer men and women in working age. As far as agricultural
inputs are concerned, they also own less land and draft animals. In light
of that, it is hardly surprising that male-headed households have higher
levels of income and assets per capita. However, such differences are
not statistically significant at any conventional level.
These simple figures highlight some interesting facts about land
rental behaviour. First of all, despite having significantly lower land
endowments, women are more likely to rent some agricultural plots
out: 21 percent of female-headed households rent out land compared to
16 percent of male-headed households.13 When women lease out land,
they tend to rent a higher proportion of their total holdings. There are
also some significant differences in the choice of tenants and type of
rental agreement: female landlords are more likely to rent their land to
relatives and not to receive any compensation when they do. However,
at an unconditional level, male landlords tend to give a higher pro-
portion of their leased land for free.14 Moreover, female-headed
households have a higher fraction of their land certified. The main
objective of the empirical analysis will be to assess how these certifi-
cates affect their decisions concerning the rental market.
As mentioned above, our dataset contains several plot level
characteristics which we will include in our empirical analysis to con-
trol for factors that might affect both the decision to obtain a certificate
and the compensation received when the plot is rented out. Some de-
scriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2 for the
full sample of plots, as well as for those that were rented out.
According to the full sample, certified plots appear to be on average
of better quality than non-certified ones. More specifically, they have
higher (self-reported) fertility, are more likely to be irrigated, flatter
and closer to the farmers’ homestead. They are also more likely to be
restricted to rice production and this would explain why are also more
likely to be cultivated with annual crops. It is important to stress that
since the majority of households have either all or none of their plots
certified (only in 10 percent of the household observations we see titled
and un-titled land), these differences most likely represent variations in
land characteristics across households rather than plot-level differences
within households.
These differences are however less pronounced in the subsample of
plots rented out. In this case, plots with and without certification have on
average the same fertility and irrigation levels, and are equally distant
from the farmers’ dwellings (although certified plots are more likely to be
sharing a border with another household plot). The sole measure of land
quality that presents a statistically significant difference in mean is the
slope, as certified plots are shown to be on average flatter. In terms of the
choice of tenant, we were not able to identify any significant difference:
certified and non-certified plots are equally likely to be rented out to
relatives. However, certified plots are less likely to be leased out for free.
5. Estimation strategy
The goal of this paper is to assess whether land certificates increase
the probability of receiving some compensation when a plot is rented to
relatives and if the impact is stronger for female-headed households.
We focus on the landowners that rent land to their relatives—which
represent almost two thirds of all temporary land transfers—because
these contracts are more likely to be influenced by social norms and the
relative bargaining power between landlords and tenants. If certificates
strengthen landlord’s property rights, we would expect that households
who have their land titled—especially those with weaker ex-ante tenure
security—are more likely to receive compensation for the land they rent
Table 1
Household level characteristics (means) by gender of the household head.







Education of household head (years) 7.68 8.37 0.00
Age of household head (years) 61.27 52.58 0.00
No. of household members 3.49 4.52 0.00
No. of men in working age 0.93 1.62 0.00
No. of women in working age 1.12 1.40 0.00
No. of draft animals 0.33 0.70 0.00
Land owned (thousand sqm) 3.43 7.04 0.00
Land Farmed (thousand sqm) 3.38 7.20 0.00
No. of non-farm activities 0.24 0.33 0.00
Income per capita (thousand VND) 21.27 22.14 0.14
Assets per capita (thousand VND) 7.00 13.26 0.28
Proportion of land with LUC 0.78 0.73 0.00
Proportion of households renting out land 0.21 0.16 0.00
Percentage of land rented out* 0.76 0.68 0.00
Percentage of land rented out to relatives* 0.70 0.65 0.04
Percentage of land rented out for free* 0.44 0.54 0.00
Percentage of land rented for free conditional
on being rented out to relatives*
0.85 0.79 0.04
N 2388 8267 –
The mean statistics are computed using the 5 waves (one every two years) of the
balanced household panel. This includes 2,131 observations across 5 time
periods.
*This proportion is calculated conditional on the household renting out some
land. There are 1824 observations in this sub-sample (approximately 17 per
cent of the full sample). From 2008 to 2016, the number of households renting
land out has increased from 13 to 20 percent. More than 76 percent of these
temporary land transfers have occurred among relatives and/or without any
type of compensation (monetary or in-kind).
Table 2
Plot level characteristics by certification status.






Area (log sqm) 6.77 6.29 0.00
Restrictions 0.34 0.51 0.00
Fertility (1 = low 3 = high) 1.94 1.95 0.00
Irrigation 0.65 0.84 0.00
Annual crops 0.86 0.90 0.00
Slope (1 = flat 4 = very steep) 1.66 1.30 0.00
Bordering another plot (1 = yes) 0.10 0.14 0.00
Distance from home (log m) 6.68 6.09 0.00
N 9355 28517
Plots Rented out
Area (log sqm) 5.95 5.92 0.56
Restrictions 0.61 0.53 0.00
Fertility (1 = low 3 = high) 1.98 1.99 0.69
Irrigation 0.87 0.87 0.69
Annual crops 0.97 0.96 0.24
Slope (1 = flat 4 = very hilly) 1.20 1.16 0.01
Bordering another plot 0.08 0.11 0.01
Distance from home (log m) 6.38 6.37 0.93
Rent out to relative 0.66 0.66 0.71
Rent out for free 0.60 0.50 0.00
N 3399 980
13 This is possibly because women also possess fewer resources to conduct
agricultural production (i.e. household members of working age and draft an-
imals).
14 The data we have tells us the monetary value of the rental agreement,
whether the tenant pays cash or in some other way (part of the harvest for
example). In the case of an in-kind payment, landlords give an estimated value
of the compensation they receive. Hence, if landlords report they received zero
compensation for the rental transaction, this means they did not receive money
or anything else in exchange for leasing the land.
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because they can choose from a wider pool of possible tenants and have
a stronger position in the negotiation process of the contracts. The first
specification we estimate takes the following form:
= + + +
+ + + +
Free Female LUC Female LUC X
Z
Pr( )pht ht pht ht pht ht
pht t c pht
1 2 3
(1)
where the probability of a plot being rented out for free (conditional on
being rented out to a relative) is modelled as a linear function of the
gender of the household head, whether the owner has a land use cer-
tificate for the plot, their interaction term, a set of household (X) and
plot (Z) level characteristics, and time and commune fixed effects.15
The estimate of 1 would indicate whether female-headed households
are less likely to receive compensation for the plots they rent out, the
sign of 2 would tell us if the LUC plays a role in the probability of
renting land for free (regardless of the landlord’s gender) and a negative
and significant estimate of 3 would corroborate the hypothesis that
LUCs have a gender-differential impact, increasing the probability of
female-headed households to obtain some payment when leasing out
land to their relatives.
In the specification described so far, the outcome of receiving or not
compensation for the land transferred is observed within a restricted
sample: the landlords that decided to transfer land to a relative.16
Hence, we are excluding all the transactions between non-relatives,
which ignore landlord’s first level decision—renting to a relative versus
renting to someone else. Such restriction can lead to problems of se-
lection bias if there are some unobservable factors that are affecting
both the choice of tenant and whether any compensation is received.
We address this concern following the two-step procedure suggested by
Ahn and Powell (1993).17 The first step consists in estimating non
parametrically the conditional mean of the probability of each rented
out plot to be given to a relative, while in the second step this index is
added non parametrically as a control in the regression of interest,
otherwise identical to Eq. (1).18
The decision to rent out to a relative, rather than any other
household or institution, is likely to be a function of the household’s
family connections and the level of trust in other community members.
More specifically, landlords that were born in the village and have a
lower level of trust in their neighbours are more likely to lease land to
their relatives. Since these variables should not affect households’ de-
cision/capability to receive a compensation for the plots rented out (at
least once other household and plot characteristic are controlled for),
they plausibly satisfy the exclusion restrictions. Therefore, the estima-
tion of the selection model is achieved by adding to the first stage a
binary variable taking value 1 if the head was born in the commune and
a dummy indicating whether the head would rather receive 3 acres of
land to farm along with a neighbour he/she is not related to (signalling
good level of trust) or 1 acre to farm alone.
Another important challenge for the identification is that plot cer-
tification is not exogenous. If we do not capture some unobservable
characteristics that might affect both the decision to obtain a LUC for a
given plot and the likelihood to receive some rent when the land is
leased out, our estimates may be biased. To address this concern we
control for community level time-invariant factors through commune
fixed effects, as well as several household and plot level characteristics.
Nonetheless, there is still the possibility that we are failing to account
for some relevant yet unobservable dimensions. Ideally, we would like
these unobservable factors to not be correlated with the probability of
receiving compensation when leasing out land to a relative, however it
is not possible for us to rule out this possibility. Hence, our estimates
may suffer from omitted variable bias.
6. Results and discussion
In this section we present and comment on the empirical results
based on the specifications described above. Furthermore, we present
some insightful region-specific estimates. Because of historical reasons,
the evolution of social institutions and attitudes towards private prop-
erty rights differ significantly between the North and the South of Viet
Nam. Hence, an aggregate analysis might be overlooking relevant
heterogeneity in the impact of land certification. We also discuss the
implications of our findings for agricultural production and household
income, and the policy implications of our findings.
6.1. Land use certificates and rental compensation
Table 3 displays a number of different estimates of the simple linear
probability model. Whenever the interaction term is not added (col-
umns 1 and 2), the estimate of β1 is negative but not statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting that female-headed households are not more likely
to rent land out for free to their relatives. However, the coefficient turns
positive and significant when the interaction term is included in column
3. This indicates that when female landlords lease untitled plots to their
relatives, they are less likely to receive any type of compensation.
Our results suggest land certification makes up for female-headed
household’s weaker tenure security. We can infer this because β3 is al-
ways negative and statistically significant, and the magnitude of its point
estimate is never statistically different from β1.19 Moreover, LUCs are
shown to have no impact on the probability that male-headed house-
holds rent out their land for free to their relatives, as β2 is never statis-
tically significant. This suggests that men’s decision to rent plots for free
to their relatives is not related to the possession of a LUC. Adding
household (column 4) and plot (column 5) characteristics does not affect
these conclusions and if anything improves the significance levels.
15 The household level variables included in the regression are: age and years
of education of the household head, number of individuals in working age,
number of draft animals owned, total value of the durable goods (log), a
dummy indicating whether the head of the household belongs to a ethnic
minority, another dummy taking value 1 when the household has experienced a
natural shock, and finally household’s income decile. The plot level char-
acteristics are the area (in logs), whether the land is planted with annual or
permanent crops, if there is an irrigation system and whether there are re-
strictions on the crops that have to be grown. Finally, we include some self-
reported indexes of land quality (1 = below average 2 = average 3 = better
than average) and terrain roughness (1 = flat to 4 = very steep).
16 Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to know the kind of relationship
between landlords and tenants (if it is their children, siblings, cousins, and so
on).
17 For some (Dubois, 2002), another important potential source of en-
dogeneity comes from the decision of landowners to become landlords instead
of cultivating their land. This paper does not model the decision to rent out
land, and instead focuses on the relationship between rental payments and
property rights, conditional on the farmer having decided to become a landlord.
Consequently, our findings are only valid for the subsample of the landowner
population that selects themselves into landownership. However, if non-ob-
served factors that drive the decision to become a landlord are also correlated
with the probability of receiving rent when leasing out to a relative, our esti-
mates could be biased. This is a problem which we cannot address directly, so
our results are meant to be taken as illustrative of the importance that LUCs
have for female-headed households who participate in land rental markets, and
not an implication of the causal relationship between property rights and rental
market participation.
18 In particular, the expected probability of renting each plot to relatives
(conditional mean) is estimated in the first step using the kernel estimator. The
second step is a semi-parametric regression where we do not impose any
functional form to the impact of the conditional mean estimated in the first step
on the probability of receiving some compensation.
19 Although the point estimates for β3 are always larger than β1, the difference
(in magnitude) between the two coefficients is never statistically significant as
indicated by the results of the formal tests presented in Table 3, that always fail
to reject the null hypothesis β1 = −β3.
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In the remaining columns, we re-estimate the same regression on
some sub-samples of the population as a robustness check. In order to
rule out the possibility that the results are driven by shocks leading to a
change in the household head, in column 6 we restrict the sample to
those households whose gender of the head has remained the same
throughout the 5 waves. In column 7, we only include households who
have all or none of their plots titled (around 90 percent of the ob-
servations), to address some concerns related to unobservable hetero-
geneity in land quality at the plot level. Finally, in column 8 we include
only households whose gender of the head never change and that have
either all or none of their land titled. The results are consistent across
all the specifications and corroborate our initial findings.
In terms of economic significance, the estimates of the gap are de-
finitely relevant. In particular, since the unconditional probability of a
plot being rented out for free when the tenant is a relative is 0.64 and
the point estimates of β1 range between 0.13 and 0.19, female-headed
households are 25 per cent less likely to receive any monetary or in-
kind compensation when renting land to their relatives. This significant
unbalance is entirely offset by the possession of land use certificates.
There are substantial regional differences that may have shaped the
way land markets evolved in Viet Nam and their current functioning.
While the Northern regions of Viet Nam had a collectivized agricultural
production system since the 1950s, in the South this system was not
introduced until the late 1970s. Even after the country’s reunification,
many farmers in the South resisted collectivization: as late as
1986—when collectivization was starting to be reversed in all the
country—less than 10 per cent of the rural households in the Mekong
Delta region had been organized into cooperatives (Pingali and Xuan,
1992). For this reason, we believe the role of LUCs in land rental market
behavior may be considerably different between North and South Viet
Nam.
The figures shown in Table 4 provide an overall description of the
differences between North and South Viet Nam in terms of land rentals.
In the North, landlords are more likely to rent out their plots for free
and/or to relatives. This tendency is more pronounced among plots that
are rented out in our sample, but it is statistically significant also among
the ones that are leased in.
As outlined in the Section 5, one potential concern related to the
simple linear probability model presented in Table 4 is that it fails to
take into account for potential sample selection. Indeed, the analysis
involves only the plots that are rented out to relatives, which might
differ from the other plots in the rental market along some unobserved
dimensions.20 If these characteristics affect also the likelihood of re-
ceiving rent, our estimates would be biased. For this reason, we also
present the results obtained applying the two-step procedure proposed
by Ahn and Powell (1993) to correct for the potential sample selection
bias.
Table 5 shows the estimates for both the simple linear probability
model (columns 1 to 3) and the model with adjustments for sample
selection (columns from 4 to 6).21 In order to check whether there is
any appreciable regional difference, the regressions are estimated for
the subsample of plots in the North (columns 2 and 5) and in the South
(columns 3 and 6) only.22
As far as the sample selection models are concerned, it is clear that
they deliver results which are entirely in line with the simple linear
models. In fact, magnitude, signs and significance of the coefficients of
interest are virtually indistinguishable. As for the regional
Table 3
Plot level linear probability model (plots rented out to relatives).
Source: Authors’ computation based on VAHRS data.
Dep variable: Plot rented out for free conditional on being rented out to relatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female −0.024 −0.024 0.130* 0.167** 0.158** 0.164* 0.182** 0.191*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
LUC 0.000 0.044 0.049 0.042 0.024 0.037 0.027
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
LUC*Female −0.194** −0.199** −0.193** −0.206** −0.237*** −0.257**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plot controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value β1 = -β3 – – 0.15 0.67 0.69 0.59 0.47 0.45
Mean y 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.65
N 2930 2930 2930 2930 2930 2596 2677 2359
Clusters 556 556 556 556 556 484 507 438
adj. R2 0.381 0.381 0.381 0.385 0.387 0.370 0.391 0.407
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column 6 presents the results for the subset of
households whose gender head has not changed throughout the period under analysis, column 7 for the subset of households with only titled or untitled plots, and for
column 8 the intersection between these two sets.
Table 4
Type of landlords, tenants and rental agreement by region.
Source: Authors’ computation based on VAHRS data.
North South p-value difference
Plots rented out to relatives 0.67 0.60 0.00
Plots rented out for free 0.57 0.33 0.00
N 2100 1022 –
Plots rented in from relatives 0.50 0.42 0.00
Plots rented in for free 0.38 0.26 0.00
N 3454 924 –
20 Similarly, we cannot rule out the possibility that households leasing land
out for free differ from the others in ways that are not captured by the
household level controls included.
21 Columns 4 to 6 present the coefficients from the second step. Since it is a
linear probability model, they can be interpreted as marginal effects and be
directly compared to the estimates in columns 1 to 3.
22 Provinces in the Northern Lowlands (Ha Tay, Phu To and Nghe An) and
Northern Highlands (Lao Cai, Lai Chau and Dien Bien) areas are included in the
Northern region, while the Southern region contains provinces located in the
Southern Lowlands (Quang Nam, Khan Hoa and Long an) and in the Southern
Highlands (Dak Lak, Dak Nong and Lam Dong).
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decomposition, the findings seem to indicate that the aggregate results
were mostly driven by households located in the Northern region
(which represents more than three quarters of the whole sample). In
fact, none of the coefficients under analysis is statistically significant for
the Southern region subsample. This indicates that in the South, female-
headed households are as likely as the others to receive rent for the
plots rented out and that the possession of a LUC does not increase the
likelihood to receive any compensation.
The results are crucially different for the Northern region. Namely,
female-headed households without LUCs are 27 percent more likely to
rent out plots for free (24 percent according to the selection model).
This gap is entirely eliminated by the possession of LUCs for the plots,
which has a significant impact only on female-headed households.
These findings indicate that land use certificates improve the bar-
gaining power of female-headed households, who otherwise seem to be
disadvantage by the existing norms governing land practices. In parti-
cular, once they have a formal certificate, they become as likely as men
to receive some compensation for the plots rented out to relatives.
6.2. Productivity losses
We expect market-based transactions (those with an agreed com-
pensation) to improve efficiency more than non-market land transfers.
This is because they are the manifestation of gains from trade that occur
when land is transferred from less to more productive producers.
Empirical evidence from Ethiopia shows that informal land transac-
tions, un-like market-based rentals, do not lead to an improvement in
agricultural productivity and factor allocation (Chen et al., 2017).
Unfortunately, a direct comparison of the productivity of tenants
and owners cannot be performed as we do not have data about the
production undertaken on plots that have been rented out by the
households in the sample. However, we can still obtain some insights by
comparing the yields of farmers who rent land in.23 Specifically, we
want to test whether households that rent in plots with an agreed
compensation (monetary or in-kind) are actually more productive than
those that rent in land for free. We focus on rice production to operate
with a consistent measure of productivity across time and regions. This
still gives us a representative picture of agricultural activity as rice is by
far the most important crop in Viet Nam.
Some suggestive evidence in this sense can be derived simply by
estimating the rice yields of all plots rented in and testing whether they
differ significantly depending on the type of contract (free rental or
not). The results of this exercise are displayed in Table 6. The first
column shows the average for the entire sample, the second column
shows the average of plots that were rented in for free, and the third
column gives us the average yields of plots that were rented in with
some agreed compensation. The first interesting fact we can observe is
that rice productivity has increased by more than 7 percent between
2008 and 2016. Moreover, rice productivity on plots rented in (both
market and non-market) is higher than that of the entire sample in
every period. However, in line with our hypothesis, we also see that, for
each year, the yields were significantly higher in plots rented in for a
fixed compensation than for those rented in for free (p-values are in-
dicated in the fourth column). The difference between market and non-
market transfers is also economically significant, ranging from 3 per-
cent in 2012 to 7.5 percent in 2016.
However, it is possible that these findings are driven by other fac-
tors than systematic differences in productivity between tenants renting
in for free and those who pay for the land. In particular, they might
reflect differences in plot specific characteristics (e.g. land quality and
irrigation facilities) or other variables such as input intensity in rice
production. In order to address these concerns, we move the analysis to
the household level, and estimate the following regression:
= +
+ + + +




it it it it
it t z it
1 2
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the rice yield of farmer i
in time t and is computed aggregating the production (and land input)
across all the plots cultivated by the household, including both owned
and rent-in plots. “Renting in” is a dummy variable taking value one
when the household i is renting at least one plot in period t (regardless
of whether they are paying for it or not), while “No rent paid” is a
dummy variable that takes value 1 when households do not pay rent for
Table 5
Sample selection model estimates, by region.
Source: Authors’ computation based on VAHRS data.
No sample selection correction Sample selection correction
All North South All North South
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.158** 0.191** −0.039 0.165** 0.171** −0.009
(0.08) (0.08) (0.22) (0.08) (0.08) (0.22)
LUC 0.042 0.067 −0.110 0.052 0.067 −0.090
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12)
LUC*Female −0.193** −0.240*** 0.098 −0.208** −0.206** 0.019
(0.08) (0.09) (0.21) (0.08) (0.09) (0.21)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plot controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value β1 = -β3 0.69 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.58 0.88
Mean y 0.64 0.70 0.41 0.64 0.70 0.41
Clusters 556 379 177 556 379 177
N 2,930 2,370 560 2,930 2,370 560
adj. R2 0.387 0.343 0.424 0.385 0.346 0.433
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
23 Even though these households are not exactly the ones we are observing
when analysing the effects of LUCs on landlord’s tenant choice and rental
agreement, we think that they will capture the overall effects of land rental
market behaviour on agricultural production since it refers to the demand side
of the rental market.
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any of the plots rented in.24 X is a vector of controls which captures
input intensity and land quality, τ is a set of year fixed effects, ς re-
presents the province or commune fixed effects, and is the error
term.25
The coefficients of interest are 1 and 2 representing respectively
the productivity gap between households who rent land in and those
who do not, and the difference between the yield obtained by tenants
who pay for the plots they lease in and those who do not.26 As shown in
Table 7, 2 is negative and significant across all specifications, in-
dicating that farmers who rent in land for free obtain lower yields than
those who pay for it, even after controlling for differences in land
quality and input intensity. Likewise, 1 is always positive and statis-
tically significant which suggests households that rent land in are more
productive than those that do not. However, this positive impact of land
rentals on productivity is likely just driven by market transactions be-
cause +1 2 is never statistically different from zero, suggesting that
farmers renting in land for free are not more productive than those that
do not rent in any land.
These estimates are also economically significant. Depending on the
specifications, farmers who rent in land for a price tend to reach from 3
to 6 percent higher yields than those who rent in for free. This re-
presents about half the impact of possessing an irrigation system ac-
cording to our estimates. As possessing a land use certificate increases
the likelihood of female-headed households to engage in market-based
transactions, they are also expected to increase agricultural pro-
ductivity through a better allocation of resources.
6.3. Income losses
By renting out land for free, households are potentially giving up a
relevant source of income. In order to quantify the magnitude of this
phenomenon, we estimate a time-province average rental rate using the
value households report to pay (in the case of land rented in) or receive
(in the case of land rented out). We then use this rental rate to compute
the income loss for households that rent out land for free. Specifically,
we estimate the rental rate by running an OLS regression where the
dependent variable is the household rent per square meter paid/re-
ceived for plots rented in/out controlling for province and time fixed-
effects, as well as a number of plot characteristics.27 According to our
estimates, households who rent out land for free are renouncing, on
average, to receive a rent that represents around 5 percent of their total
income.
As we mention before, the subsample of landlords is quite hetero-
geneous. On one side, some farmers rent out land because they are
leaving agriculture for more profitable activities (rich landlords). On
the other, farmers with limited non-land agricultural factors are no
longer able to cultivate all of their landholdings so they lease out their
property (poor landlords). Therefore, we provide a more disaggregated
analysis based on income to better understand the implications of non-
market rentals for income dynamics.
In Fig. 1, we present the mean and standard deviation of the po-
tential income lost faced by each landlord that leases land for free, by
income quintiles.28 From the corresponding results, it is clear that the
impact on poorer households is quite remarkable. For households in the
Table 6
Average rice yields (t/ha) of plots rented in by year and type of contract.
Source: Authors’ computation based on VAHRS data.






2008 4.54 4.69 4.93 0.04
2010 4.56 4.73 4.94 0.08
2012 4.72 4.86 5.02 0.09
2014 4.85 4.79 5.09 0.02
2016 4.87 4.92 5.29 0.00
Overall 4.71 4.81 5.03 0.00
Table 7
OLS results on the effect of market and non-market rentals on rice productivity.
Source: Author’s calculation based on VARHS data.
Dependent variable: rice yields (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rent land in 0.044*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.031***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rent land in * Rent
land for free
−0.050*** −0.062*** −0.047*** −0.024*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Land farmed (log) −0.087*** −0.092*** −0.114***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Labour days (log) 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.065***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Irrigation (1 = yes) 0.122*** 0.062***
(0.01) (0.01)





Slope (base = flat)




Very steep −0.382*** −0.222**
(0.11) (0.09)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes No
Commune FE No No No Yes
p-value β1=-β2 0.76 0.87 0.70 0.41
N 8,197 8,197 8,197 8,197
adj. R2 0.149 0.171 0.229 0.367
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
24 95% of households renting land in either rent all the plots for free or pay
for all of them. We remove the households that have both plots rented in for
free and for compensation to maintain a consistent comparison among house-
hold productivity.
25 Land quality measures are fertility, slope and irrigation. As they are ori-
ginally ordered categorical variables defined at the plot level, they are ag-
gregated at the holding level with a two steps procedure. First of all, a weighted
average is computed using the plots’ area as weights. Then, the variables ob-
tained are rounded to the closest integer to be assigned to each category.
Although household head characteristics are also likely to affect productivity,
we do not control for them. The reason is that we want to understand the
production implications of land rental markets, particularly the differences
between market and non-market transactions. Hence, if a farmer obtains land
through the market because she is better educated or younger (observable
features that are positively related to ability), this does not concern us as it is
still efficiency enhancing that younger and more educated farmers obtain more
agricultural factors.
26 Note that by construction the dummy variable “No rent paid” can only take
value 1 when “Renting in” is equal to 1 as well, therefore the same results would
have been obtained by entering the two dummies separately as opposed to the
interaction term.
27 Namely, we control for plot size, self-reported fertility, slope, irrigation,
crop-choice restrictions and whether is devoted to annual or perennial crops.
28 The income quintiles are computed using the entire household sample. The
richest quintile has the higher proportion of households renting out land for
free. Indeed, 30 percent of landlords leasing out for free belong to the highest
quintile.
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lowest income quintile, the income loss represents on average almost 12
percent of their annual income. This is a particularly relevant for fe-
male-headed households as they are over represented in the lowest
quintiles. In the case of landlords leasing land out for free, 54 percent of
the female-headed households belong to the two bottom quintiles (35
percent to the bottom one) as opposed to only 27 percent for men (13
percent to the bottom one).
6.4. Policy implications
The high prevalence of informal transactions in land rentals markets
raises concerns because of two factors. First, it may reduce overall
agricultural productivity because the farmers who obtain the land are
not the most capable. Second, these transactions can partly be the re-
flection of a weak enforcement of property rights, leading those with
tenure insecurity to lease their land in less favourable terms. In support
of the latter hypothesys, we show that women have a higher probability
of leasing their land for free to their relatives unless they possess a LUC
for the plot. Such informal transactions have detrimental effects on both
agricultural production and landlords’ income. In particular, we find
that tenants obtaining land for free deliver systematically lower yields
than those who acquire it through market transactions, and that poor
landlords are giving up a significant share of their income by not ob-
taining any compensation from their tenants.
Interestingly, our findings on women’s rental market parcipation are
mostly driven by the dynamics of rental markets in the North of Viet
Nam; a region where land institutions are historically different and the
process of transition in a agriculture to a market-based activity has not
fully materialised. This result highlights the importance of paying close
attention to the certification of land for groups that have been tradi-
tionally marginalized in terms of access to resources.
7. Conclusions
In the period under analysis, Viet Nam has witnessed a remarkable
growth in land rental market activity, with a nearly 50 percent increase
in the share of agricultural plots that were rented in or out by rural
households. Interestingly, a considerable number of these temporary
land transfers occurred among relatives and did not contemplate any
type of compensation to the landowner. Understanding the implications
of these non-market transactions is very important, particularly in Viet
Nam where, despite rapid growth in productivity and land transfers,
agricultural factor misallocation has increased in the last 10 years
(Ayerst et al., 2018).
In this paper we provide evidence that some of these informal
transactions are the result of differences in power between female and
male-headed households. According to our results, female-headed
households are less likely to receive any rent payment when they lease
out their plots to relatives, unless they have a certificate for the plot.
This suggests that they might have weaker rights over the land, but
legal documents strengthen their claims over their assets and increase
their bargaining power in the negotiation of the rental terms.
Additionally, we quantify the impact of these transactions for agri-
cultural production and household income.
There are significant differences between the Northern and
Southern provinces in terms of their social institutions and attitudes
towards market-oriented policies, particularly in agrarian issues. We
show that our results are being driven mostly by the dynamics of the
land rental market in the North. In this region, where land transactions
among relatives are common both for male and female landlords, fe-
male-headed households are more likely to receive compensation when
they have a LUC for the plots they lease out. In the South, the possession
of a land title does not affect women’s probability of receiving a pay-
ment when leasing out to relatives.
Our results suggest that clear and enforceable property rights have a
positive impact on female-headed households’ ability to obtain a more
convenient agreement when renting land to members of their family. By
improving the bargaining power of groups with weaker ex-ante prop-
erty rights, land use certificates might not just guarantee a fair com-
pensation to vulnerable households but also contribute to allocate land
to farmers willing to pay for it (and arguably more productive) rather
than to individuals obtaining it by virtue of their relative strength in the
extended family.
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Appendix A. Unilateral transfers from relatives
As pointed out in the previous sections, one of the main concerns related to the increasing share of informal transactions in the land rental
markets, beside the arguments related to the potential resulting inefficiencies, is that landlords might fail to receive an adequate compensation for
their land. The issue is particularly crucial as a large fraction of the landlords in our sample is constituted by poor female-headed households.
However, there is the possibility that households renting their agricultural plots for free might receive some sort of indirect compensation in the
form of unilateral cash or in-kind transfers not directly included in the contract.29 We are not directly able to rule out this possibility as we do not
have any further information on the contract terms and on the identity of the relatives acting as tenants, but we can study whether renting out plots
to relatives for free is correlated with an increase in the probability of receiving unilateral transfers from relatives (not necessarily the same) or in
their total amount.
Fig. 1. Average and standard deviations of potential income losses by income
quintiles. Note: The horizontal dotted line represents the sample average, the
points are the means for each quintile and the vertical lines the standard de-
viation of the quintile specific averages. Source: Authors’ calculation based on
VAHRS data.
29 From the questionnaire, we only know whether any form of direct compensation (in cash or kind) was contemplated by the rental agreement.
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In order to check whether it is the case, the following household regression is estimated:
= + + + +Transfers landforfree shock landforfree shock Xht ht ht ht ht ht1 2 3
'
ht
and the resulting estimates are displayed in Table A1 and Table A2. 30
In particular, the dependent variable is either a dummy taking value 1 when the household receives unitary monetary transfers from its relatives
(Table A1) or the logaritm of the value of these transfers (Table A2). We are prevalently interested in assessing whether having some plots of land
rented out to relatives for free increases the probability and/or the amount of the transfers received, captured by the coefficient 1. In the first two
columns, the main explanatory variable is a dummy that indicating whether the household is renting at least one plot for free, while in columns 3 and
4 the log of the area of land rented out for free is considered.
Another possibility that needs to be taken into account is that leasing land for free to relatives might be conceived as a way to ensure a safety net
in case of unexpected negative shocks (Promsopha, 2015). If that was the case, this behaviour would not necessarily give rise to an increase in the
unilateral transfers, but rather to an increased support from relatives in case of negative shocks. The occurrence as well as the gravity of household
level shocks are captured by the percentage of person days lost due to adverse circumstances in the previous year, computed as the fraction of days
working age individuals were not able to work due to illness or injuries. This variable is also interacted with either the dummy indicating whether
land is rented out for free (columns 1 and 2) or to the acreage of plots given out for no compensation in order to assess whether these transfer-
sactually lead to a more substantial support in case of unforeseen detrimental shocks.
According to our estimates, neither renting at least one plot to relatives for free nor the total area of land rented out to relatives without receiving any
direct compensation has any impact on the probability of receiving some transfers (Table A1) or on the amount of the transfers received (Table A2).
Moreover, although households suffering shocks are more likely to receive transfers, we find no evidence of a higher amounts being transferred to those
who have some land leased out for free to relatives.31 These findings seem to exclude these free rental contracts have any indirect benefit to the landlords.
Table A1
Transfers from relatives outside households. Dependent variable: household receives transfers from relatives (Yes = 1).
Source: Authors’ computation based on VAHRS data.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Renting out for free (yes = 1) −0.015 −0.006 – –
(0.02) (0.03)
Area rented for free (log) – – −0.002 −0.011
(0.01) (0.02)
% Person days lost (shocks) 0.405*** 0.343*** 0.407*** 0.346***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
Interaction 0.004 −0.010 −0.002 −0.017
(0.12) (0.17) (0.02) (0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household covariates Yes No Yes No
Household FE No Yes No Yes
N 10,655 10,655 10,655 10,655
Adj-R2 0.122 0.102 0.122 0.102
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Household controls: gender, education and age of the household
head, number of components in working age, log of assets’ value, whether the household has experienced an agricultural shock and if the household is renting out any plot.
Table A2
Transfers from relatives outside the household. Dependent variables: Value of transfers received from relatives (log).
Source: Authors’ computation based on VAHRS data.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Renting out for free −0.037 0.081 – –
(0.22) (0.28)
Area rented for free (log) – – −0.000 0.011
(0.04) (0.04)
% Person days lost (shocks) 3.742*** 3.515*** 3.773*** 3.540***
(0.58) (0.83) (0.58) (0.84)
Interaction 0.877 0.040 −0.092 −0.024
(1.23) (1.58) (0.17) (0.22)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household covariates Yes No Yes No
Household FE No Yes No Yes
N 10,655 10,655 10,655 10,655
Adj-R2 0.149 0.151 0.149 0.151
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Household controls: gender, education and age of the
household head, number of components in working age, log of assets’ value, whether the household has experienced an agricultural shock and if the household is
renting out any plot.
30 Note that the dependent variable refers only unilateral transfers. Therefore, the cash inflows for land rented out or other transactions are not included.
31 The regressions presented include household level covariates (columns 1 and 3) or fixed effects (columns 2 and 4), but the results are robust to a wide range of
specifications.
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